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1. Introduction 
In The Creative Mind, Margaret Boden gives us a useful philosopher’s-eye 
perspective on the important subject of creativity. While her book is primarily 
targeted at a popular audience, it has the potential to generate interest and debate 
on a topic that deserves more attention in the research community. Boden argues 
that creative thought is necessarily the result of the application of existing 
knowledge, that the naive notion of creativity as random novelty is useless, that 
mechanical creativity is possible, and that the beginnings of a scientific explana- 
tion of human creativity are emerging. We agree with these points, although we 
will have more to say about the last in what follows. 
Some would argue that creativity is too broad and ill-defined to possibly hope 
for the development of a mechanistic theory. AI’s standard reply is and has been: 
well, then, let’s bite off a small chunk of it, come up with a simple theory (maybe 
even a rather stupid one), test it out, see where it breaks down, and try again. 
Boden describes some of the promising results that have developed as a result of 
this strategy. However, she says little about the rationale for all of this work, 
except for its value as a refutation of those who say that it cannot in principle be 
done. We believe there are more compelling reasons than this, and it is worth 
mentioning some of them. 
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2. Why creativity is important to explain 
Creativity is important to understand and explain because: 
( 1) It is a natural phenomenon we observe in human beings, and thus deserves 
a rigorous explanation. Creative thought is an essential part of what it 
means to be human, and it is a very common phenomenon. Neurologists 
are very unlikely to come up with useful explanations for it. Most 
psychologists will be similarly ineffectual, wedded as they are to the 
method of controlled experiment on one side (cf. [18]) and overly vague 
psychodynamic theories on the other. It seems clear that an understanding 
of human creative thought must come from Al and Cognitive Science. 
(2) It is an interesting and potentially fruitful research front. The idea, for 
example, that a Macintosh might someday solve an unanticipated glitch in 
its operating system without having the diagnosis procedure explicitly 
pre-wired in its software is alluring and is a reasonable desire. Or consider 
the possibility that a scientist’s workstation could be the originator of a new 
explanation for topsoil deterioration. Or that an educational computer 
simulation could dynamically invent new worlds well-suited to individual 
students’ knowledge and interests. 
(3) It is closely tied to the problem of learning, which is one of the most 
serious research hurdles for AI. Making sense of a new, anomalous event 
for which a strong domain theory is not available-a very common human 
predicament-necessarily involves creative bending and stretching of our 
existing stock of rules, cases, and metaphors to acquire new knowledge. A 
child learning about what is possible in the physical world requires an 
iterative cycle of imagining, constructing, and evaluating. It’s hard to 
imagine a computer being able to learn anything really new without 
imbuing it with a creative “attitude“ that impels it to doggedly push on its 
existing knowledge. 
(4) It is an attribute that we want to encourage and develop in people. 
Creative insights have many tangible and intangible benefits: they can 
result in faster growth in worker productivity. fundamentally new products 
and services, less mystery and bewilderment about our world, and less 
apathy and passivity in people. In simple terms, it would be a tremendous 
boon to society if we could effect a higher number of creative insights per 
person per year. But in order to teach people how to be more creative, we 
first must understand the creative process better. 
This fourth reason points to an important issue that we feel Boden might have 
addressed more carefully. One feature of creativity is that it can be learned and 
enhanced; the starting point of creative thought is asking questions and looking 
for anomalies, and these activities can be consciously and deliberately initiated. 
When we ask a greater number and variety of questions about anomalous or even 
“normal” phenomena, we can retrieve experiences and concepts from memory 
whose relevance is not immediately obvious, and we can creatively adapt the 
knowledge accessed in this way to understand the phenomena in new ways. 
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Creativity is often stifled by education. Children are naturally full of questions, 
but our education system teaches “formulaic thinking”; children memorize a large 
body of officially-approved facts, theories, and rules and come to believe there is 
a correct answer for every question. Learning formulas inhibits creativity, because 
we come to rely on them for everything; even when formulas are available, they 
are often wrong in the sense that they limit possibilities. One alternative to 
formulaic education is to instead teach examples and cases, and to teach how to 
reason from examples. Examples can be acquired by students either by showing/ 
telling them interesting and useful stories, or by letting them experience, either in 
simulation or by real-world activity, what it is like to act in a particular role in a 
particular scenario. Students taught in such a manner will find learning more 
engaging and relevant, they will learn to think and ask questions spontaneously, 
and they will ultimately be more creative throughout their lives. 
To be creative, one must not be afraid of failure. Boden acknowledges this in 
Chapter 10 where she discusses the contrast between the attitudes of self- 
confidence and anxiety. As she puts it (p. 257) 
. . . anxiety is a mechanism that leads us to consider more possibilities than 
we otherwise would, whereas confidence enables us to continue our current 
line of thought despite the lack of any quick success. . . . Both rest on a 
judgment of the likelihood of success, a judgement that concerns not only the 
intrinsic difficulty of the problem but the person’s self-image, too. 
3. Kinds of creativity 
In Chapter 3, Boden makes a useful distinction between what she calls 
P-creativity (psychological creativity), which concerns ideas that are fundamental- 
ly novel with respect to the individual mind which had the idea, and H-creativity 
(historical creativity), concerning ideas that are novel with respect to the whole of 
human history. Boden notes that “although H-creativity is the more glamorous 
notion, . . . P-creativity is more important for our purposes”. (p. 32) We share this 
perspective. However, the rest of Boden’s book fails to match her sentiment; 
most examples of human creativity that she cites are striking examples from the 
history of art and science. This is disappointing. Both from a methodological and 
a psychological standpoint, it will be much more profitable to focus on the most 
common and mundane forms of P-creativity. Creative insight is really a rather 
common kind of thinking, one that people are hardly aware of. 
We claim that probably ninety percent of what Boden labels P-creativity is 
creative explanation of ill-understood or anomalous phenomena in one’s world. 
Certainly, the average person has a number of creative insights and inventions 
during his lifetime that are striking enough to impress his friends and associates; 
for the sake of argument, let us say between fifty and five hundred. But before we 
even attempt to explain those instances of P-creativity, doesn’t it seem prudent to 
first explain the thousands of “mundane” P-creative insights that every normal 
person experiences from childhood through old age? A large proportion of our 
everyday thinking is devoted to making sense of the world by trying to explain 
things to ourselves; and the new insights we get, while often invisible to others, 
are relatively frequent and, in varying degrees, creative. Just as we now realize 
that the most central problems of natural language involve issues of commonsense 
reasoning rather than tricky counterfactual constructions or logical scope dis- 
ambiguation (e.g. [ 19])9 we must realize that an understanding of creativity will 
come from the modeling of rather normal, everyday P-creative inferences and 
insights, rather than from rational reconstructions of scientific breakthroughs. 
Along the lines of this philosophy. work in our laboratory [g-10, 141 has 
developed theories of creative explanation involving the novel application of 
explanation patterns. An explanation pattern is a fossilized explanation stored and 
indexed in memory: when activated, it connects an event in need of explanation 
with an explanation that has previously been constructed for a similar event. 
Retrieval and reuse of explanation patterns is far more common than invention 
of an explanation by backward-chaining inference. 
Creativity is needed when none of the retrieved explanation patterns quite tit 
the new event. There are then two separable processes in the creative application 
of explanation patterns: finding new candidate explanation patterns for considera- 
tion. and altering the constraints of a given explanation pattern so that it applies 
to the current event. This latter process is referred to as tweaking, and a number 
of heuristic strategies for tweaking are proposed. such as: 
l Relax set membership constraints. 
l If a condition is clearly false. ignore it temporarily, and make it true later if 
the rest works out. 
l If an agent could not have been responsible for an action. hypothesize 
another agent who could have. 
l If a rule applies in a given situation. try reversing its actors and objects and 
see what happens. 
l Rather than using the obvious or default object, substitute another object 
that also satisfies the rule. 
This model has been implemented in a program called SWALE, whose basic 
algorithm consists of five stages: anomaly detection, memory search for an 
explanation pattern, attempt to apply explanation pattern, tweaking of explana- 
tion pattern, and integration into memory with appropriate generalizations. 
Tweaks are designed to operate on explanations in a broad range of domains. 
SWALE’s tweaking strategies and the heuristics in Lenat’s mathematical discov- 
ery program AM [l l] are similarly motivated. Both attempt to generate new 
knowledge by perturbing existing knowledge representations. However, AM was, 
in essence, designed to invent interesting new concepts. SWALE, on the other 
hand, is designed to build new explanations for a given set of circumstances in a 
more goal-directed fashion; specifically, each tweak is invoked to address a 
particular explanation failure. 
Boden discusses several different programs that attempt to model aspects of 
creativity. Some of the programs seem to us more creative than others. We will 
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not go into a program-by-program ranking, but there are some choices by Boden 
that merit critical examination. 
4. Induction as creativity 
In Chapter 8, Boden talks about inductive programs such as ID3 [13]. She 
describes how, with appropriate training, these programs can automatically 
generate classification rules, and suggests that they are creative in the same sense 
that “people can P-create their own concepts” (p, 183). There is no doubt that 
the classification rules generated by inductive algorithms are novel in the sense 
that they are not provided by the programmer. In fact, rules are sometimes 
generated that no human expert had ever formulated before, which causes Boden 
to entertain the idea that such programs are creative. These programs are, as 
Boden admits, generally run on a highly restricted and carefully chosen set of 
input features, but she does not deny that the program is creative. Although the 
inclusion of inductive algorithms in her mural of creative computer programs is 
not central to her claims, we feel that some very crucial issues are being 
overlooked. In an important sense, inductive algorithms exemplify the antithesis 
to creativity. 
Induction is something that simple animals are capable of; it provides, for 
example, a model which could be used to describe the way a sea slug learns to 
classify things in its world (see [7]). A sea slug trained with experiences involving 
electric shocks could be said to be inducing rules that help it to classify new 
environments; new environments are recognized as members of the leads-to-pain 
category in terms of features that the sea-slug’s perceptual apparatus allows it to 
discriminate. It could be pointed out that perception of those particular features is 
pre-wired in the sea slug’s sensory transducers and nervous system. Is that 
substantially different from inductive learning algorithms that require feature 
preselection by a human expert? 
It should be clear that induction of classification rules is hardly a remarkable or 
admirable feat, particularly in human terms. Granted, inductive learning algo- 
rithms can extend and exceed human abilities in situations where there are huge 
numbers of training examples, huge feature sets, and/or logistical problems in 
getting all the relevant data in front of one person. However, induction is what is 
referred to in AI as a weak method; as with other weak methods like exhaustive 
search and hill-climbing, induction is used when there is no knowledge available 
to guide one’s effort. Further, inductive algorithms require huge numbers of 
training examples (cf. [ 171); and inductive experiments must be “set up” with a 
very narrow focus. 
To ascribe creativity to the output of a weak method is problematic, at best. 
Creativity is simply impossible without the application of knowledge. Of course, 
while induction by itself is insufficient for creativity, generalizing from data could 
be a tool of creative thinking. Creative thought-particularly in the case of the 
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formulation of explanations or of scientific models-typically involves the steps of 
deciding what to look for, looking at it. making hypotheses, and evaluating them. 
The weak method of induction could be used as a tool for generating hypotheses, 
by identifying featural regularities in the data. However, as any scientist will 
attest, the hard part comes before this: it involves asking the right questions, and 
determining what features to attend to in the subsequent processes. After the data 
is collected and sorted, regularities in the data may be noted and explained. 
During this explanation process. new questions are proposed, various explanation 
patterns are juxtaposed with those regularities. contradictions and absurdities are 
acknowledged. and new features are considered. This knowledge-intensive 
process is the heart of explanatory creativity. 
Determination of what constitutes the “work” in creative behavior requires 
careful attention to computational issues. Boden has been remiss in this instance 
by not noticing that the arduous feature selection part was performed by humans 
and that the program only did a simple inductive search. 
It could be countered that, while “supervised” inductive classification programs 
like ID3 must rely on pre-specification of categories, unsupervised conceptual 
clustering algorithms embody a form of inductive learning that is more creative 
because new categories are actually generated (e.g. [3]). (It is surprising that 
Boden did not consider this possibility.) While this idea is intriguing on the 
surface, it is immediately apparent that. with both kinds of inductive learning, 
pre-selection of input features by a human expert is an inescapable requirement; 
and, as we have just noted, this feature selection process is the only creative part. 
Furthermore, an examination of the clustering method reveals a brute force 
strategy typically involving exhaustive calculations of statistical correlations. The 
human users of such algorithms may be creative when they are setting up these 
programs; but the algorithms themselves, being weak methods, are certainly not. 
And when the algorithm produces the new clusters, it provides no clue as to what 
use or significance the new clusters might have; that burden must be shouldered 
by some other intelligence. 
On page 185. Boden reminds us that positive value is a criterion of creativity. 
She suggests that, since ID3 has had a very high success rate in performing a 
socially useful function (viz. soybean disease diagnosis), perhaps we should 
consider ID3 to be creative. This argument is a bit specious: the fact that a 
computer algorithm (or a bulldozer or even a hammer) extends the capabilities of 
human practitioners in a socially useful way does not imply that those tools are 
creative. 
In sum, when proposing candidates for computer creativity, it is best to exclude 
stand-alone inductive learning programs from consideration. If they are included, 
critics of the idea that computers could be creative might easily be tempted to 
hold up such algorithms as “proof” that computers are .fundamentally incapable 
of creative behavior. In addition, it is important not to confuse computer 
creativity with tools that aid human creativity or with the creativity of the 
designers of such tools. 
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5. Connectionist creativity 
A more or less similar problem arises in Boden’s discussion of connectionist 
algorithms. As with inductive learning algorithms, the features that are the inputs 
to the nets are preselected by human experts. While the ingenuity of the designers 
who figure out what those inputs should be is admirable, their programs are not 
creative. The same argument applies to so-called “structured connectionism”, 
which uses the outputs of some networks as inputs into other networks: these 
meaningful “intermediate nodes” (i.e. non-hidden-layer nodes that connect 
different networks) are also carefully and cleverly pre-selected by the designers, 
leaving nothing for the neural net algorithms to do but uncreatively induce and 
classify. There is no systematic way of applying strategic knowledge to the 
reasoning or problem-solving process. 
The requirement that the designer of the network specify the combinations that 
are useful for the task stems from the fact that a connectionist network cannot 
compute all combinations of all inputs. In technical terms, the connectionist is not 
merely aiming to trade time for space; so the assumption made is that the number 
of output features of units, and the number of units in intermediate layers, must 
be at most polynomial in the number of inputs. Thus, the network must compute 
only those combinations that are potentially useful, and the designer must 
construct what elsewhere in AI would be called the vocabulary of a representation 
theory, a painstaking task demanding much thought and experimentation by the 
designer [ 11. 
Boden’s approach in Chapter 6 seems to be something like, “Let’s use 
connectionism as a general purpose net to catch thoughts and ideas that 
apparently fall through the cracks of symbolic rule-based models”. Creative 
insight usually appears to involve some kind of violation of the operant rules, and 
so the rule-based model must be inadequate, and so the connectionist model 
(frequently viewed as the only model that is a serious competitor to symbolic 
models of cognition) must account for these inadequacies. After all, physically the 
brain is a network of neurons and not a Von Neumann machine. 
It is usually the case that, while it may at first glance appear that creative 
insights cannot be accounted for “by the rules”, upon closer scrutiny it is possible 
to discern creative metacognitive strategies and heuristics-essentially rule- 
driven-which could account for paths leading to those insights. As was discussed 
previously, one can deliberately adapt and “tweak” the more conventional rules 
and cases in ways that other knowledgeable people might not expect. Whether or 
not you like calling such metacognitive strategies and heuristics “rules”, it is clear 
that those rule-things are essential to any mechanistic account of creativity. SO the 
point is: if one is tempted to think that the symbolic model cannot be made to 
account for a particular bit of creativity, perhaps one hasn’t yet tried hard 
enough. Granted, it is usually impractical to reverse engineer a real, actual 
example of creativity; but, as Boden points out, at present we are merely looking 
for a model that could account for creative thought in principle. 
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Furthermore, as Boden correctly points out. current connectionist models are 
inadequate with respect to important issues like higher-order relations and 
sequential reasoning. It is unlikely that these hurdles can be overcome in the 
foreseeable future. Connectionist implementations of forward and backward 
chaining theorem provers or production systems will not suffice-not because of 
any limitations of connectionism per se. but because such general models of 
symbolic computation in and of themselves offer no advantage: the simple- 
minded application of connectionist models to sequential reasoning is inherently 
too slow for combinatorial reasons. Thus. any “solutions” to these hurdles would 
be of less value than regular rule-based models. 
But perhaps the most salient issue has to do with the phenomenon for which 
Boden brought in connectionism in the first place, namely, “unconscious associa- 
tions”. Unconscious associations, Boden asserts, are necessary for creative 
insight, and symbolic rule-based models cannot account for them. 
A number of issues must be raised. For one, it is obvious that symbolic models 
can account for unconscious inference and associations. People can parse and 
comprehend language, for example, without being aware of how they do it. Many 
low-level perceptual processes (such as scene analysis) have been modeled with 
symbolic rules. Even some complex problem solving and interpretation activities 
can become so automatized as to become nearly inaccessible to conscious 
introspection. So it is certainly conceivable that what Boden refers to as 
unconscious association could be implemented using a symbolic rule-based 
scheme. 
At the same time it must be asked whether connectionist models have been 
successful at modeling the kinds of associations required for creative insight. 
Despite a long discussion of the mechanisms and strengths of connectionist 
models, Boden does not shed much light on this issue. This is especially troubling 
when we consider the kinds of cross-contextual and analogical similarities that are 
characteristic of the unconscious associations yielding creative insight. As Gentner 
[6] and others have shown, formation and recognition of analogies depend 
crucially on the relational structure of the base and target concepts, and reasoning 
with relations is one of connectionism’s most glaring weaknesses. 
It is important to bear in mind that. despite a few abstract similarities to the 
physical arrangement of the brain’s nerve cells, the connectionist neural net is just 
another metaphor for understanding cognition. There is no particular reason why 
the connectionist model should be the best one to model unconscious association. 
In addition to standard symbolic models which have been discussed, there exist 
other viable models that seem well-suited to this problem. For example, consider 
Dennett’s [5] Multiple Drafts model of consciousness. Or else consider Minsky’s 
[12] Society of Mind model, or Birnbaum and Collins’ [2] related model of goals 
as active opportunistic agents. While it may not be immediately obvious how to 
implement these models computationally, they could provide a framework for 
explaining how useful unconscious associations can emerge and be recognized. 
To briefly sketch how Birnbaum and Collins’ model could apply, for example, 
let us consider the account of Kekule’s insight which is described in Boden’s 
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book. Kekule, a 19th-century chemist, had for months been obsessively trying to 
conceptualize the structure of the benzene molecule, composed of six carbon 
atoms and six hydrogen atoms, which could not be given a chemically intelligible 
molecular structure. One day when Kekule was dozing and visualizing snakelike 
chains of atoms, one snake seized hold of its own tail; Kekule awoke in a flash, 
recognizing that, contrary to chemical theories of the time, the benzene molecule 
could be arranged in the form of a ring. Now, in Birnbaum and Collins’ model, 
goals themselves are active cognitive agents, capable of commanding both the 
cognitive resources needed to recognize opportunities to satisfy themselves and 
the behavioral resources needed to take advantage of those opportunities. Such 
goals actively observe the mental processing being carried out for other goals, not 
only inspecting features of that processing, but also drawing inferences about how 
those features might be useful for their own satisfaction. Applying this to 
unconscious association, one could easily imagine unconscious intentions-to- 
understand that were consciously spawned in the past and which actively search 
for combinations of concepts that might be useful for obtaining an explanation, 
attaining coherence, or solving a puzzle. For example, Kekule may plausibly have 
formulated an intention to understand the structure of the benzene molecule, and 
this intention became an obsessive, active agent which constructed complex 
inferences about molecular chains and looked for opportunities to find appro- 
priate explanation patterns or analogies that would aid it in its task. A virtue of 
this approach is that, clearly, something must have prepared for that insight to 
happen and recognized its worth when it happened; Kekule’s hard-won insight 
that “it didn’t have to be in a straight line” undoubtedly required extensive 
inferencing about complex spatial and chemical relations, and it is inconceivable 
that the right association could have been obtained in a random, bottom-up 
fashion without the influence of the relevant goals. 
In our estimation, connectionism seems destined in the long run to be relegated 
mostly to low-level perceptual processes and simple pattern-recognition tasks, and 
we consequently feel it is somewhat futile to look to connectionism for useful 
insights about creative insight. 
6. Degrees of creativity. . . 
Although in some of her arguments he seems to disregard the point, on pages 
153 and 178 Boden stresses that creativity is a matter of degree. This is a crucial 
point which we feel should not be glossed over carelessly, because anyone who 
insists that a computer could never be creative is likely to ignore or dismiss this 
graded character of creativity. Furthermore, an all-or-nothing view of creativity 
could entail methodological disadvantages for research, because if the focus is on 
extraordinarily or “really” creative achievements, this may demand the selection 
of skewed or impractically complex problems to work on. 
An analogous problem crops up in the debate over whether a computer could 
ever be intelligent or “really” understand. As Schank [14] has pointed out, it is 
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often unclear how well people can understand each other. Weizenbaum once 
asserted that a computer would never understand a shy young man’s desperate 
longing for love because a computer lacks experience in human matters of the 
heart [20]. What Weizenbaum missed is that understanding is not an all-or-nothing 
affair: people achieve different degrees of understanding in different situations, 
depending upon their level of familiarity with those situations. These degrees 
range from just making sense of someone’s utterance to experiencing complete 
empathy with the other person. AI programs so far have only managed things on 
the “making sense” side of the spectrum, but the aim is to work gradually towards 
the other side of the spectrum. not to break through some mythical wall that the 
definition of the Turing test implicitly postulates. 
Similarly, creativity is not an all-or-nothing affair. All of us from time to time 
judge one idea to be either more or less creative than another idea. And for a 
given creative insight, we can expect that two different people could have an 
honest and material disagreement about whether it was “not particularly creative” 
or “extraordinarily creative”. As with degrees of understanding, there is an 
inescapable subjective element in the assessment of the degree of creativity, based 
on the evaluator’s experience, knowledge, and values.’ 
A related issue concerning computer understanding applies equally well to 
computer creativity. How important is it that the internal processes that produce 
the output be completely faithful to our intuitions about the way humans produce 
similar output? When we judge how well a computer has understood, need that 
judgment depend on more than the output? Obviously, we do not (and do not 
need to) examine the innards of people in order to establish that they are 
understanding (cf. Dennett’s “intentional stance”, [4]). But people do interpre- 
tively assess other people’s level of understanding on the basis of the others’ 
output, and the question of whether the others “really” understood is not 
important in any practical sense (unless perhaps you are in a philosophy class). 
The same sort of reasoning applies to evaluating the degree of creativity of 
people’s output. 
Boden touches on this issue when she describes a program that produces 
reasonably interesting haiku poems. She points out that 
In general, the more the audience is prepared to contribute in responding to 
a work of art, the more chance there is that a computer’s performance (or, 
for that matter, a human artist’s) may be acknowledged as aesthetically 
valuable. (p. 159) 
In effect, the observer contributes meaning to the output of the program, and can 
do so without any consideration of how the words were produced. This will be the 
‘For this reason, Boden’s criterion that a creative idea “m some relevant sense, would not have 
occurred before” (p. 31) is potentially troublesome. ignoring the mare’s nest of what “could not have 
occurred” might possibly mean. this criterion raises the possibility that there is a litmus test which can 
be applied to determine whether a given idea is or is not creative. There just is no simple test of 
whether something is creative. 
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case whether the output is a sparse flourish of haiku-words, a paragraph in a 
technical journal, or a short video clip appearing on a computer screen. In all of 
these cases, the observer must impose some kind of interpretation on the patterns 
affecting his retina. His evaluation of the creativity-r (as the case may be) the 
intelligence, or the degree of understanding-of the producer of the output is not 
contingent on the method by which that output was produced. 
We work under this assumption as we design intelligent educational software 
here at the Institute for the Learning Sciences. Many of our programs contain 
large libraries of cases, examples, and stories in the form of video or text. The 
student interacts with the program in a manner somewhat analogous to a 
conversation with a librarian. If the student describes his interests well enough to 
such a librarian, one could imagine the librarian being able to do one of three 
things: the librarian might tell the student where to look for what he wants; the 
librarian might find an item that fits perfectly what he described (without knowing 
the actual contents); or the librarian could remember a suitable item he had 
previously read/examined and converse with the student about its contents. The 
librarian would be considered intelligent in each case, but in different degrees 
(the third being the highest). 
Our programs are generally equivalent to the second case. Text and video clips 
are carefully labeled in advance by human content analysts. Then, when the 
program is used by a student, more or less specific questions from the student 
cause the “automatic librarian” to intelligently retrieve the best item from 
memory without any knowledge of the actual contents of the item. Nevertheless, 
when the student examines the retrieved artifacts, he has the experience of a 
coherent conversation and feels that, for all practical purposes, the program has 
understood his questions. These programs, therefore, clearly embody a degree of 
intelligence. They would be more intelligent if they could discuss the contents of 
each selected item and explain why they believe the item is relevant to the 
student’s question; however, the lack of these abilities simply means that the 
programs are located at some point along the intelligence continuum, not that the 
programs have no intelligence. 
Similarly, a person reading the computer-generated haiku attributes some 
degree of creativity to whatever produced it. It is an inescapable fact that his own 
interpretative processes have contributed to this assessment, but to prohibit the 
observer’s interpretive processes from entering into the assessment is to exclude 
the very possibility of ever recognizing creativity, whether it is computer-gener- 
ated creativity or human-generated creativity. In fact, prohibiting interpretation 
would preclude a person who creates something from even recognizing his own 
creativity! 
7. . . . and degrees of value 
On the other hand, while a haiku-generating program that randomly combines 
and prints strings of seventeen dictionary words might on rare occasions produce 
140 R.C‘. Schank. D.A. Fbstrr I Artificiul Intelligence 79 (199.5) 129- 14.3 
poems that people agree are creative, still, there are other serious problems. 
Exhaustive generation of possibilities is sure to produce, given infinite time and 
given an infinitely patient human evaluator, a few worthwhile pieces of output. 
But exhaustive generation is not sufficient for creativity; as Boden rightly asserts, 
creativity is a function of value: 
The concept of creativity if value-laden. A creative idea must be useful, 
illuminating, or challenging in some way. But an unusual combination of 
ideas is often of no use or interest at all. Strictly then, the criterion of 
value . . should be explicitly stated by combination-theories, not merely 
tacitly understood? (p. 30) 
We believe that Boden has hit the nail on the head, although more exploration 
concerning the criterion of value would have been helpful. 
There are many kinds of value, and many reasons that we might find a new idea 
useful or interesting. In general, the best way to understand how we judge such 
ideas is by reference to our goals: something is useful or interesting to the extent 
that it may help us achieve one or more of our goals. Goals such as: improving 
our theory of the world (to control it or function in it better); inventing a new 
product (to make our lives more comfortable or safer); improving a social process 
(to make work or learning more effective); or making sense of an anomalous 
event (to dispel our bewilderment or confusion and to improve our theory of the 
world). As a further breakdown of the last kind of goal, we often desire to: 
establish if an actor has something coherent in mind; find the natural context for 
an event in terms of an actor’s beliefs and plans; find new predictive rules that 
hold for a group; or add potentially useful facts to our personal data base. A 
deeper understanding of creativity cannot be attained without a rich, detailed 
theory of the kinds of goals that determine the criteria by which new ideas are 
judged for usefulness and interestingness. Without such a theory, it is very 
difficult to specify or operationalize the crucial component of a creative program 
that critiques the ideas it generates and culls out the good ones. Ultimately, when 
these criteria are specified carefully and thoroughly enough, the foundation will 
have been laid for the development of programs whose creative output we value 
for its own sake rather than for the sake of the theoretical refinements that the 
programs suggest. 
In summary, we generally agree with Boden that creativity is a matter of 
degree, the assessment of creative output is justifiably viewed as a matter of 
interpretation by the human observer, and picking through mechanically-gener- 
’ In case the reader suspects some contradiction here with the previous discussion concerning the 
gradedness of creative ideas: a critiquing component is a necessary feature of a creative program, but 
not sufjicient. A program that evaluates and critiques what it generates could produce somewhat 
creative ideas, very creative ideas. or no creative ideas. 
As a separate matter, this issue of value should not be confused with the earlier discussion 
concerning the societal value ID3 has to offer. Like a sorting algorithm, ID3 could be a valuable and 
useful tool, but nothing in the ID3 algorithm is evaluating whether the classification rules it is 
generating will be useful or valuable to society. 
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ated ideas is necessarily a function of value. These issues, while possibly banal in 
appearance, could be overlooked or subverted in ways that undermine Boden’s 
central claims; thus, Boden should have provided a firmer footing for each of 
these generalizations. 
8. A scientific explanation? 
As stated previously, we agree that a mechanical, and in fact, a scientific 
explanation of creativity is possible. And Boden is exactly right in saying that a 
scientific account of creativity would not devalue creativity; our feeling is that the 
more we understand creativity, the more we admire it. There are, however, 
potential pitfalls that appear when one uses the word “science”, and it is 
important to carefully avoid them. It is easy to imagine readers of this book 
asking themselves questions like: Just because we have analyzed some of the 
requirements for creative thought, and even written a handful of programs that 
each seem to work on a handful of examples, is that “science”? Have we proved 
anything? Have we discovered any law of nature? Is drawing a picture or 
constructing a model necessarily going to demonstrate any truths about the 
world? Unfortunately, Boden’s last chapter does not adequately address these 
kinds of issues, and so her heedless flaunting of the “S” word creates some large, 
tempting openings for critics. 
Some of these questions have to do with the general questions of (a) whether 
the assumptions of Cognitivism are justifiable, and (b) whether AI can become 
science. Our answer to both is “of course”. By now, practitioners of AI are 
experienced at handling the first question, and so we will not belabor that issue. 
But some comments concerning the second are warranted. 
AI is not science: it is engineering. Some might conceivably prefer to regard AI 
as something like a “proto-science”; we are not yet able to establish precise “laws 
of cognitive nature” because there is still a dire need for a better vocabulary and a 
better set of models for understanding and accounting for mental phenomena like 
memories, representations, plans, and other mental structures. The computer 
provides us with a test bed that enforces a degree of rigor and explicitness 
previously unattainable by psychologists (as the usual logic goes), and by 
developing better and better models that account for more and more reasoning 
situations, the hope is that eventually AI will evolve into a truly scientific 
enterprise. 
However, until now this model of AI has usually resulted in the building of 
programs of limited generality that only work on a handful of examples. We 
maintain that such programs cannot be really intelligent because they do not 
satisfy the “scale up” criterion; that is, AI must be about building systems that 
can handle hundreds or thousands of examples, not just two or three. The process 
of scaling up a system provides so many functional constraints on the system that 
without it one has to be skeptical of the system’s architecture and its ability to 
really perform the task it was designed to do. 
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If progress is to be made in modeling human capabilities such as creativity, the 
focus must be on the research strategies in AI. not on philosophical discussions. 
In [16], several suggestions are presented that address the issue of effective 
scale-up in AI. including: 
l Real problems are needed for prototyping. We cannot keep working in toy 
domains. 
l A lack of serious attention to software engineering issues ensures failure. 
l While everyone wants to do theoretical research, no progress will be made if 
everyone does so. 
l The single most important activity in Al is tool building. 
These are the practical issues that will help AI to get to the next level of theory 
and to yield new. (careful!) scientific insights about creativity. 
To summarize: we believe that the right question isn’t whether a mechanistic 
explanation of creativity is possible-it’s how. Evocative discussions of mental 
maps and conceptual spaces won’t bring us closer to the answers, but develop- 
ment of programs that 
(1) model ordinary, everyday P-creativity, 
(2) are primarily based on the application of stored knowledge. and 
(3) scrupulously address scale-up issues 
most certainly will. 
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